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Courts vs. The Political Branches: Immigration
“Reform” and The Battle for the Future of
Immigration Law
BRIAN G. SLOCUM*
When the topic of immigration reform is discussed, the focus is usually on the
efforts of the political branches, particularly Congress. The role of the judiciary is
typically ignored or mischaracterized. In this Article, Professor Slocum discusses
the role of the judiciary with regard to immigration reform and argues that the
judiciary’s efforts in one area of immigration law in particular, judicial and administrative review, have been largely underestimated. Through various methods, the
judiciary has thwarted many of the efforts of the political branches to reform
judicial and administrative review by precluding or diminishing review. While
significant, the judiciary’s efforts are not completely satisfying for two reasons.
First, the judiciary’s decisions have rested on nonconstitutional grounds, leaving
areas of judicial and administrative review in need of further reform. Second, the
judiciary’s primary focus on judicial and administrative review has ignored the
equally fundamental ways in which immigration law fails to conform to the rule of
law.
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B.

INTRODUCTION
The concept of “reform” typically connotes an improvement, or at least an
attempted improvement, of a flaw.1 For some time, immigration law has been
deeply flawed due to its harsh provisions, lack of rights afforded aliens, and
consequent isolation from other areas of public law.2 Unfortunately, over the
last couple of decades, the political branches’ efforts at reform in immigration
law have not attempted to fix these problems but instead have knowingly made
them worse. Congress’s efforts at reform have been mostly anti-immigrant in
nature, including particularly troubling attempts to divest courts of jurisdiction
to review many challenges to deportation.3 In turn, the executive branch’s
reforms have included attempts to undermine the independence of administrative adjudicators and to expedite the administrative review process by providing
for less administrative review.4 To make matters worse, Congress has recently
considered other reforms that would further erode the availability and quality of
judicial and administrative review, and any executive branch reforms designed
to significantly improve the administrative adjudication process for aliens are
unlikely.5
In sum, the recent immigration policies promoted by the political branches
have privileged harshness and efficiency and subordinated fairness and adequate

1. See, e.g., THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1468 (4th ed. 2000)
(defining “reform” as “1. A change for the better; an improvement”).
2. See Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1 (1984)
(“Probably no other area of American law has been so radically insulated and divergent from those
fundamental norms of constitutional right, administrative procedure, and judicial role that animate the
rest of our legal system.”). This Article uses the term “alien,” which is a legal term under United States
immigration laws signifying any individual “not a citizen or national of the United States.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004). The term is considered by many to be pejorative. Case law and
scholarly articles refer extensively to “alien” and “alienage,” however. In order to avoid unnecessary
confusion, the term will be used in this Article.
3. See infra Part I. Although the expulsion of aliens is now referred to as their “removal,” see 8
U.S.C. § 1229(a) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004), this Article will also use the generic term “deportation” to
refer to the expulsion of all classes of aliens.
4. See infra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 87-96 and accompanying text.
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process.6 Not surprisingly, both Congress’s and the executive branch’s efforts at
reform have drawn considerable criticism from immigration commentators.
Commentators have argued that Congress’s attempts to preclude judicial review
and grant the executive branch unfettered discretion over many immigration
matters have undermined the rule of law, and the executive branch’s reform
efforts have placed the administrative courts in crisis.7 The conventional view
among immigration commentators is that the judiciary’s extreme deference to
the political branches in regard to immigration policy has enabled these reforms, thereby contributing to the decline of effective administrative and judicial review.8
The conventional view of the role of the judiciary in facilitating political
branch reforms is partially accurate. Courts have long maintained that immigration matters, more than most other areas of congressional concern, involve
political determinations and have created and maintained doctrines of deference
that reflect this philosophy. Under the infamous “plenary power” doctrine,
created by the Supreme Court in the late nineteenth century, courts have
traditionally considered the power of Congress over immigration to be nearly
unlimited and the constitutional rights of immigrants to be almost nonexistent.9
With some exceptions, the judiciary has relied on the plenary power doctrine in
rejecting most constitutional challenges to immigration decisions made by the
political branches.10
While it is partially correct, the standard theory of extreme judicial deference

6. The pursuit of harsh and unfair immigration policies by the political branches is certainly not a
recent development in immigration law. The federal government’s early restrictions on immigration
were motivated by racial animus, and certain races were denied eligibility for citizenship. See Richard
A. Boswell, Racism and U.S. Immigration Law: Prospects for Reform After “9/11?”, 7 J. GENDER RACE
& JUST. 315, 317-322 (2003). This Article’s focus, though, is on the recent reforms of the political
branches and the judiciary’s response to those reforms.
7. See, e.g., Stephen H. Legomsky, Deportation and the War on Independence, 91 CORNELL L. REV.
369 (2006); Recent Case, Immigration Law—Administrative Adjudication—Third and Seventh Circuits
Condemn Pattern of Error in Immigration Courts—Wang v. Attorney General, 423 F.3d 260 (3rd Cir.
2005), and Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828 (7th Cir. 2005), 119 HARV. L. REV. 2596 (2006)
[hereinafter Recent Case].
8. See, e.g., Stephen H. Legomsky, Fear and Loathing in Congress and the Courts: Immigration and
Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1615, 1616 (2000) (describing the “clear though qualified pattern of
genuine discomfort—on the parts of both Congress and the judiciary—with the notion of a significant
judicial role in immigration matters”); Daniel Kanstroom, Surrounding the Hole in the Doughnut:
Discretion and Deference in U.S. Immigration Law, 71 TUL. L. REV. 703, 709 (1997) (describing the
“fabric of discretion and judicial deference”). To his credit, Professor Legomsky has also recognized
that courts frequently interpret immigration statutes in favor of aliens. See STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY,
IMMIGRATION AND THE JUDICIARY: LAW AND POLITICS IN BRITAIN AND AMERICA (1987).
9. See, e.g., Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional
Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255, 255 (stating that “[i]n an undeviating line of cases spanning almost one
hundred years, the Court has declared itself powerless to review even those immigration provisions that
explicitly classify on such disfavored bases as race, gender, and legitimacy”).
10. Id.; Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural Surrogates for
Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625 (1992) (describing some of the common
exceptions to the plenary power doctrine).
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to the political branches in immigration matters is typically overstated. The
standard account fails to recognize the judiciary’s increasing inclination to
promote its own version of desirable public values in limited, but extremely
important, areas of immigration law. In contrast to the values promoted by
Congress and the executive branch through their reforms, the judiciary has,
through various methods, pursued a more pro-immigrant set of values. The
judiciary’s decisions have, for the most part, been made through the (often
aggressive) application of mainstream principles of law and statutory interpretation, although courts are also undoubtedly motivated in part by the view that
aliens as a class are vulnerable to adverse legislation.11
The judiciary’s efforts have mostly focused on issues relating to judicial and
administrative review. These judicial actions are not part of a coordinated effort
at preventing ill-conceived political branch reforms of judicial and administrative review, and, to be sure, the judicial reactions to the reforms of the political
branches have not been uniformly hostile.12 Nevertheless, the significant efforts
of the judiciary in undermining some of the reforms of the political branches
stand in sharp contrast to the prevailing view of the judiciary as meekly
deferring to the policy choices of the political branches in immigration matters.
In short, the efforts of the judiciary have been largely underappreciated.
At the same time, the judiciary’s efforts in responding to the reforms of the
political branches also contain lessons about the likely de facto limits of judicial
reforms of immigration law. The scope of the judiciary’s response to the
reforms of the political branches has been limited by its traditional reluctance in
immigration cases to invalidate political branch actions on constitutional grounds.
Even in areas such as judicial and administrative review where the judiciary is
most comfortable in thwarting the policy preferences of the political branches,
both judicial and administrative review continue to be flawed and in need of
reform due to the inherent limitations of the judiciary’s non-constitutional
decisions. Moreover, the judiciary has focused mainly on judicial and administra11. In INS v. St. Cyr, for example, the Court noted that concerns about retroactive laws become more
acute when they target an “unpopular group” and stated that “because noncitizens cannot vote, they are
particularly vulnerable to adverse legislation.” 533 U.S. 289, 315 & n.39 (2001) (citing Legomsky,
Fear and Loathing in Congress and the Courts, supra note 8, at 1626). Concern for the vulnerability of
aliens and the harshness of deportation influenced the Court to create a rule of statutory interpretation,
the immigration rule of lenity, which directs courts to interpret ambiguities in immigration statutes in
favor of aliens. See Brian G. Slocum, The Immigration Rule of Lenity and Chevron Deference, 17 GEO.
IMMIGR. L. J. (2003); Medina-Morales v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 520, 525-26 (9th Cir. 2004) (indicating that
it would apply the immigration rule of lenity when determining the scope of provisions that purported
to limit judicial review).
12. In fact, in the past some immigration scholars have argued that the Court has often unfairly
interpreted statutes against aliens. See, e.g., Michael G. Heyman, Immigration Law in the Supreme
Court: The Flagging Spirit of the Law, 28 J. LEGIS. 113, 113 (2002) (claiming that the “Court has
consistently used a mechanical approach to interpretation and excluded an exploration of statutory
purpose.”); Kevin R. Johnson, Responding to the “Litigation Explosion”: The Plain Meaning of
Executive Branch Primacy Over Immigration, 71 N.C. L. REV. 413, 419 (1993) (arguing that the
“Rehnquist Court is willing to invoke the plain meaning doctrine selectively in interpreting the INA to
ensure that the courts defer to the executive branch”).
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tive review and has consequently often ignored the other equally fundamental
ways in which immigration law fails to conform to the rule of law.
This Article attempts to shed new light on the role of the judiciary in
immigration reform, focusing on the often overlooked and undervalued efforts
of the judiciary in thwarting the reforms of the political branches, but at the
same time recognizing the limited nature of the judicial role in immigration law.
The focus of this Article is not on exhaustively describing the reforms of the
political branches and the judiary’s response to them, but rather on providing an
accurate depiction of the judiciary’s self-appointed role in immigration law.13
Part I briefly describes the congressional reforms of judicial review and the
executive branch reforms of the administrative adjudication process.14 Part II
explains how the judiciary has undermined some of the reforms of Congress
and the executive branch. Part III discusses possible future reforms to judicial
and administrative review and argues that while these reforms would be valuable, they are only one aspect of the larger failure of immigration law to
conform to the rule of law. Due to the judiary’s conservative approach in
immigration matters, however, true reform will have to come from the political
branches.
I. CONGRESSIONAL AND EXECUTIVE BRANCH EFFORTS TO REFORM JUDICIAL REVIEW
AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION PROCESS
Congress has a long history of attempting to eliminate or curtail judicial
review of immigration decisions.15 Perhaps the most notorious congressional
efforts came in 1996 when Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)16 and the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA).17 These laws attempted to
undermine judicial review in several ways.18 Among other changes, the statutes
amended the judicial review provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act

13. Thus, while some of the description of the judiciary’s response to the political branches’ reforms
of judicial and administrative review may seem somewhat like an outline, I believe that it accurately
depicts the philosophy of the judiciary with regard to the reforms of the political branches.
14. The discussion is brief because other immigration commentators have comprehensively described the congressional and executive branch reforms. See, e.g., Susan Burkhardt, The Contours of
Conformity: Behavioral Decision Theory and the Pitfalls of the 2002 Reforms of Immigration Procedures, 19 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 35, 44 (2004) (describing the executive branch reforms); Gerald L.
Neuman, Jurisdiction and the Rule of Law After the 1996 Immigration Act, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1963,
1975-77 (2000) (describing the reforms to judicial review).
15. See LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND THE JUDICIARY, supra note 8, at 144-51; Henry M. Hart, Jr., The
Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L.
REV. 1362, 1389 (1953) (noting that the “structure of review has been developed by the courts in the
face of a statutory plan of administrative control which looked neither to their help nor interference”).
16. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
17. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996).
18. Cf. Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 486 (1999) (stating that
“protecting the Executive’s discretion from the courts . . . can fairly be said to be the theme of the
legislation”).
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(INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and purported to withdraw all judicial review from
aliens convicted of certain crimes.19 The statutes also amended § 1252 to
preclude judicial review of most discretionary decisions by the Attorney General and, arguably, attempted to deprive courts of jurisdiction over habeas
corpus petitions.20
In addition to its jurisdiction stripping provisions, IIRIRA also gave the
government the power of “expedited removal,” whereby a person arriving in the
United States with improper travel documents can be removed within fortyeight hours and barred from returning for up to five years.21 IIRIRA removed
most forms of judicial review, as well as administrative review, in cases where
expedited removal procedures are used.22 Since the expedited removal provisions of IIRIRA became effective in April 1997, the government has removed
tens of thousands of aliens from the United States via the expedited removal
process.23
The executive branch has also recently made several reforms to the immigration courts. The administrative adjudicatory system is housed in the Executive
Office for Immigration Review within the Department of Justice. Immigration
Judges are the trial courts of the system, and the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA) hears appeals of the Immigration Judges’ decisions.24 Both Immigration
Judges and members of the BIA are appointed by the Attorney General.25 In
2002, faced with a backlog of over 60,000 cases, the BIA began to significantly
expand its use of procedures designed to expedite the review process.26 Before

19. See David Cole, Jurisdiction and Liberty: Habeas Corpus and Due Process as Limits on
Congress’s Control of Federal Jurisdiction, 86 GEO. L.J. 2481, 2484 (1998); M. Isabel Medina, Judicial
Review—A Nice Thing? Article III, Separation of Powers and the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1525, 1525-34 (1997).
20. See Neuman, supra note 14, at 1975-77.
21. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (2000). The expedited removal process could also be potentially
applied to aliens who enter the United States without inspection and cannot establish that they have
been physically present in the United States continuously for the two-year period immediately prior to
the date of the determination of inadmissibility. See Karen Musalo et al., The Expedited Removal Study:
Report on the First Three Years of Implementation of Expedited Removal, 15 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS
& PUB. POL’Y 1, 4 (2000). Other abbreviated removal methods include procedures known as administrative removal and judicial removal. See John R.B. Palmer et al., Why are so Many People Challenging
Board of Immigration Appeals Decisions in Federal Court? An Empirical Analysis of the Recent Surge
in Petitions for Review, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 15-17 (2005).
22. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii), (b)(1)(C), (b)(1)(D) (2000); see also Gerald L. Neuman, Federal
Courts Issues in Immigration Law, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1661, 1674-79 (2000) (analyzing jurisdictional and
constitutional implications of expedited removal); Lenni B. Benson, Back to the Future: Congress
Attacks the Right to Judicial Review of Immigration Proceedings, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1411, 1449-52
(1997) (discussing controversy surrounding the lack of administrative and judicial review for persons
subject to new expedited removal provisions).
23. See Michele R. Pistone & John J. Hoeffner, Rules are Made to be Broken: How the Process of
Expedited Removal Fails Asylum Seekers, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 167, 167 (2006).
24. See Legomsky, supra note 7, at 371-72.
25. See id.
26. See Burkhardt, supra note 14, at 44. The 2002 reforms followed more modest reforms throughout the 1990s. See id. at 44-45.
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the reforms, the BIA typically sat in three-member panels and issued formal
written opinions. In 2002, however, the Attorney General sought to hasten the
resolution of immigration cases by eliminating twelve of the twenty three BIA
members and providing that many cases would be heard by a single member of
the BIA and affirmed without a written opinion.27 In addition, the Attorney
General took other actions that reinforced the notion that Immigration Judges
and BIA members are employees of the Department of Justice rather than
independent adjudicators.28
II. THE JUDICIARY’S RESPONSE TO THE REFORMS OF THE POLITICAL BRANCHES
Contrary to the common view of the judiciary as meekly acquiescing in the
policy choices of the political branches, the judicial response to the recent
reforms of judicial and administrative review reveals an increasing uneasiness
with a limited and deferential judicial role in immigration cases. Section A of
this Part describes how the judiciary has impeded congressional reforms of
judicial review through narrow statutory interpretations, often applying canons
of statutory construction which reflect values far different than the ones reflected in the statutes. Section B describes how the judiciary has responded to
the executive branch reforms by harshly criticizing the performance of the
administrative courts, reversing cases, showing a greater willingness (some
would say eagerness) to remand cases to the BIA for adequate administrative
explanation and scaling back deference to agency legal interpretations. Section
C.1 explains just how significant the judiciary’s efforts have been. Section C.2
describes the limits of the judiciary’s efforts and explains that its relatively
conservative jurisprudence has resulted in, for example, critical executive branch
decisions not being subject to judicial review.
A. The Judiciary’s Efforts to Preserve Judicial Review
Perhaps the most consistent and aggressive judicial response to the congressional reforms in IIRIRA was the judiciary’s insistence on interpreting the
jurisdiction stripping provisions narrowly. For example, while IIRIRA amended
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) to provide that “no court shall have jurisdiction to
review any final order of removal against an alien who is removable by reason
of having committed” various criminal offenses, courts quickly held that they
had jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction. Courts thus interpreted the preclusion
as not preventing them from determining whether the alien had been convicted
of one of the criminal offenses listed in § 1252(a)(2)(C), which was the sole

27. See id. at 46-50; see also 8 C.F.R. §§ 1002-1003.11 (2006).
28. See Legomsky, supra note 7, at 372-75. There have long been concerns about the independence
of Immigration Judges and the BIA. See, e.g., Developments in the Law—Immigration Policy and the
Rights of Aliens, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1286, 1363-66 (1983) (arguing that the “implicit threat of abolition”
of the BIA by the Attorney General “undermines the independence of the Board’s judgment”).
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legal claim of many of the aliens covered by the provision.29 Courts also
narrowly interpreted IIRIRA’s preclusion of judicial review of discretionary
determinations in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B), which provides that “no court shall
have jurisdiction to review . . . any judgment regarding the granting of [various
types of discretionary relief from deportation],” as only precluding challenges to
the Attorney General’s exercise of discretion. Thus, review of errors of law was
still available.30 In addition, some courts held that the bars to judicial review in
8 U.S.C. § 1252 did not preclude the consideration of constitutional challenges
or habeas corpus petitions.31
In many of the cases where jurisdictional bars were interpreted narrowly,
courts applied “substantive” canons of statutory construction, which are policy
based directives about how a lack of statutory clarity should be resolved.32
Courts have frequently applied various substantive canons in immigration cases
in recent years in order to protect aliens from such things as the retroactive
application of immigration statutes, indefinite detention by the executive branch
and, more generally, from having ambiguous immigration statutes interpreted
against them.33 In cases involving the potential preclusion of judicial review, a

29. See, e.g., Alarcon-Serrano v. INS, 220 F.3d 1116, 1119 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that the court had
jurisdiction to review whether the alien had committed one of the enumerated crimes in § 1252(a)(2)(C));
Yang v. INS, 109 F.3d 1185, 1192 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding the same); see also David A. Martin, Behind
the Scenes on a Different Set: What Congress Needs to do in the Aftermath of St. Cyr and Nguyen, 16
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 313, 324 (2002) (stating that “much recent BIA case law has been devoted to deciding
whether certain offenses amount to aggravated felonies under the new definitions” in IIRIRA).
30. See, e.g., Romero-Torres v. Ashcroft, 327 F.3d 887, 890 (9th Cir. 2003) (“We retain jurisdiction
to review the purely legal and hence non-discretionary question whether [the applicant’s] adult daughter
qualifies as a ‘child’ for purposes of the ‘exceptional and extremely unusual hardship’ requirement.”)
(quoting Montero-Martinez v. Ashcroft, 277 F.3d 1137, 1144 (9th Cir. 2002)); Gonzalez-Oropeza v.
U.S. Att’y Gen., 321 F.3d 1331, 1332 (11th Cir. 2003) (indicating that the court still had jurisdiction to
review non-discretionary legal decisions that pertain to statutory eligibility for discretionary relief).
31. See, e.g., Robledo-Gonzales v. Ashcroft, 342 F.3d 667, 680 (7th Cir. 2003) (stating that “this
court has continued to assert its jurisdiction to review substantial constitutional questions” even when
review is purportedly barred by 8 U.S.C. § 1252); Garcia v. Att’y Gen. of the United States, 329 F.3d
1217, 1222 (11th Cir. 2003) (noting that “in construing the bar in the IIRIRA permanent rules, this
Court has determined that, if the bar applies, it nonetheless retains jurisdiction to consider constitutional
challenges to the INA or any other ‘substantial constitutional issues’ arising out of the alien’s removal
proceedings”); Anwar v. INS, 107 F.3d 339 (5th Cir. 1997) (determining that court had jurisdiction to
review a due process allegation notwithstanding the jurisdictional bar in AEDPA). See infra notes 38-41
and accompanying text for discussion of how the Court interpreted IIRIRA as not precluding habeas
corpus jurisdiction.
32. See Brian G. Slocum, Canons, The Plenary Power Doctrine and Immigration Law, 34 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007).
33. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) (utilizing the canon of constitutional
avoidance in interpreting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) as not allowing the executive branch to indefinitely
detain aliens who legally are considered to have entered the country); INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289,
320 n.45 (2001) (holding that provisions in AEDPA and IIRIRA that repealed discretionary relief from
deportation did not apply retroactively because the provisions lacked a “clearly expressed statement of
congressional intent” that they be applied retroactively); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449
(1987) (citing to the immigration rule of lenity, “the longstanding principle of construing any lingering
ambiguities in deportation statutes in favor of the alien”).
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“traditionally sensitive area[],”34 courts have long expressed a policy of interpreting statutes to maintain judicial review if at all possible. For example, the Court
applied the presumption in favor of judicial review in McNary v. Haitian
Refugee Center, Inc.,35 and Reno v. Catholic Social Services, Inc.,36 in order to
preserve judicial review of challenges to the 1986 legalization program. Not
only were the preclusions of judicial review interpreted narrowly, lower courts
also issued broad remedial orders to address INS misconduct.37
Recent decisions involving habeas corpus jurisdiction also reflect a judicial
desire to interpret statutes to preserve habeas review unless extremely precise
and express statutory language precludes them from doing so. In Demore v.
Kim,38 the Court held that it had jurisdiction to consider Kim’s habeas corpus
challenge to his detention pending his removal hearing because the relevant
provision, 8 U.S.C § 1226(e), did not contain the “superclear statement, ‘magic
words’ requirement for the congressional expression’ of an intent to preclude
habeas review.”39 In INS v. St. Cyr,40 the Court, after applying the canon of
constitutional avoidance (“avoidance canon”), the presumption in favor of
judicial review of administrative action and the “longstanding rule requiring a
clear statement of congressional intent to repeal habeas jurisdiction,” rejected
the government’s argument that Congress in IIRIRA and AEDPA had clearly
divested courts of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 over habeas corpus
actions filed by criminal aliens to challenge their removal orders.41
B. The Judiciary’s Efforts to Undermine the Reforms of the Administrative
Adjudication Process
In comparison with its reaction to the reforms of judicial review, the judiciary
has not been as directly active in disrupting the executive branch’s efforts at
reforming the administrative adjudication process. One reason for this is that the
executive branch’s reforms obviously were not implemented in statutes, and the
judiciary has thus not been able to undermine the reforms through narrow
statutory interpretations. The judiciary has also adhered to its traditional reluctance to strike down the policy choices of the political branches on constitutional grounds and has refused to declare that any of the reforms to the
administrative adjudication process are unconstitutional. For example, courts
have uniformly held that the expedited removal provisions do not violate due
process.42 Similarly, courts have rejected arguments that affirmance without
34. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 298.
35. 498 U.S. 479 (1991).
36. 509 U.S. 43 (1993).
37. See Martin, supra note 29, at 322-23 (describing the “remarkably broad remedial orders” issued
by courts).
38. 538 U.S. 510 (2003).
39. Id. at 517 (quoting St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 327 (Scalia, J. dissenting)).
40. 533 U.S. 289 (2001).
41. Id. at 299.
42. See, e.g., Flores-Ledezma v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 375 (5th Cir. 2005).
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opinion decisions violate an alien’s right to due process by eliminating individualized, reasoned and meaningful administrative decisions.43
Although they have not struck down any of the reforms to the administrative
adjudication system on constitutional grounds, the courts have expressed frustration with the performance of the immigration courts.44 Judge Posner, for one,
has argued that “the adjudication of [immigration] cases at the administrative
level has fallen below the minimum standards of legal justice.”45 In January
2006, the Attorney General responded to the criticisms by ordering “a thorough
review” of the immigration courts.46 Not surprisingly, although the Attorney
General touted the twenty-two new measures implemented as a result of the
review, the changes were relatively minor, including the hiring of more immigration judges, adding four permanent members to the BIA and encouraging the
increased use of one-member written opinions (as opposed to summary affirmances) and “limited use of three-member written opinions (as opposed to
one-member written opinions) to provide greater analysis in a small class of
particularly complex cases.”47
The judiciary has also undermined the executive branch reforms in more
direct ways. Appeals of administrative decisions have increased significantly
since the executive branch reforms, and courts have not hesitated to reverse
administrative decisions.48 Some courts have also held that due process requires
that a case be remanded to the BIA for clarification of the grounds for its
decision when the BIA summarily affirms the Immigration Judge’s decision,
and the Immigration Judge’s decision was based on alternative grounds, one of
which was not subject to judicial review and one of which was subject to
judicial review.49 Undoubtedly, this practice of judicial remands (which is a
43. See, e.g., Yuk v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1222, 1229 (10th Cir. 2004) (“An alien has no constitutional
right to any administrative appeal at all.”); Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc).
44. See Recent Case, supra note 7, at 2596-97.
45. Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 830 (7th Cir. 2005); see also Pramatarov v. Gonzales,
454 F.3d 764, 765 (7th Cir. 2006) (discussing the “common failings in recent decisions by immigration
judges and the Board” to produce decisions that have a rational basis).
46. See Maria Arhancet, U.S. Attorney General Orders Review of Immigration Courts, 20 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 333 (2006).
47. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales Outlines Reforms for
Immigration Courts and Board of Immigration Appeals (Aug. 9, 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
opa/pr/2006/August/06_ag_520.html.
48. See Benslimane, 430 F.3d at 829 (comparing the reversal rate in immigration cases of 40% to the
18% reversal rate in other civil cases); Palmer et. al., supra note 21, at 6 (concluding that the increased
appeal rate is a result, in part, of a “general dissatisfaction with the BIA’s review”). But see Edward R.
Grant, Laws of Intended Consequences: IIRIRA and Other Unsung Contributors to the Current State of
Immigration Litigation, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 923, 957-58 (2006) (concluding that the overall rate of
reversal has not changed since the executive branch reforms).
49. See Cueller Lopez v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 492, 495-98 (7th Cir. 2005); Lanza v. Ashcroft, 389
F.3d 917, 924-32 (9th Cir. 2004). This is hardly the only way for courts to handle the issue. The Tenth
Circuit, for example, has held that it will review the Immigration Judge’s decision rather than the BIA’s
unexpressed reasons and will thus not automatically remand in situations where the BIA summarily
affirms an Immigration Judge’s decision that is based on alternative grounds. See Ekasinta v. Gonzales,
415 F.3d 1188, 1193-94 (10th Cir. 2005).
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rather aggressive way to handle the problem of summary BIA affirmances)
could have a significant effect on the efficacy of the administrative summary
procedures.
Although such reluctance is no doubt motivated by more than the executive
branch reforms, the judiciary has also increasingly formulated legal rules that
illustrate a growing disinclination to defer to agency legal interpretations. In the
now-famous case Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc.,50 the Supreme Court held that courts must defer to an agency’s interpretation when the relevant statute’s meaning is ambiguous and the agency’s interpretation “is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”51 This deference
reached its peak in immigration cases in INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre,52 when the
Court made clear that Chevron deference applies to legal interpretations made
by the BIA in adjudications.53
The scope of Chevron deference in general has been narrowed by the Court
in recent years.54 Indeed, courts in immigration cases have been particularly
eager to limit Chevron deference. Several circuits have indicated that no
deference is due the BIA when it has no special expertise regarding the
particular issue or when it resolves “purely legal questions.”55 In addition,
courts often choose to apply canons of statutory construction instead of Chevron
deference in cases of statutory ambiguity.56 Significantly, considering the Attorney General’s efforts to streamline the administrative adjudication process,
some courts have held that Chevron deference is not appropriate when the BIA
summarily affirms an Immigration Judge’s decision.57

50. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
51. In the view of some, the Court’s decision in Chevron represented a departure from the previous
standard of review. See, e.g., Maureen B. Callahan, Judicial Review of Agency Legal Determinations in
Asylum Cases, 28 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 773 (1992) (arguing that prior to Chevron agency legal
interpretations were reviewed de novo).
52. 526 U.S. 415 (1999).
53. Id. at 425 (noting that the reasons for giving deference to agency decisions are “especially appropriate in
the immigration context” because “officials ‘exercise especially sensitive political functions that implicate
questions of foreign relations’”) (quoting INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 110 (1988)).
54. See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 191 (2006) (discussing how
Chevron’s applicability has been limited through the Court’s introduction of “Chevron Step Zero”—an
initial inquiry into whether the Chevron framework applies at all).
55. See Slocum, supra note 11, at 546-52.
56. See id. (explaining how some courts have applied clear statement canons instead of deferring to
agency interpretations).
57. See, e.g., Garcia-Quintero v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 1006, 1013-14 (9th Cir. 2006); Lin v. U.S. Dep’t
of Justice, 416 F.3d 184, 189-90 (2d Cir. 2005). The Ninth Circuit in Garcia-Quintero refused to afford
Chevron deference even though the Supreme Court in Aguirre-Aguirre had granted Chevron deference
in a case involving an unpublished BIA decision. Even more dramatically, the Ninth Circuit has made
statements suggesting that the Attorney General’s interpretations of the INA may no longer be entitled
to Chevron deference because the Department of Homeland Security now has responsibility for
immigration enforcement. See Lagandon v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 983, 987 n.3 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The
Supreme Court has indicated that courts may not owe full Chevron deference to an agency charged with
adjudicating issues under a statute when a different agency is charged with enforcement of the
statute.”).
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C. The Significance of the Judiciary’s Efforts to Undermine the Reforms of the
Political Branches
1. Aggressive Statutory Interpretations and the Canon of Constitutional
Avoidance
It is undeniable that the judiciary has given itself, through statutory interpretations favorable to aliens, a considerable role in determining the existence and
scope of judicial review of final orders of deportation.58 In response to Congress’s anti-immigrant, anti-judicial review reforms of the INA in IIRIRA,
courts interpreted the provisions narrowly, often relying on pro-immigrant
canons of statutory construction that reflect policies likely at odds with Congress’s intent in enacting IIRIRA.59 In addition, while courts have responded to
the executive branch reforms in more indirect ways, the increased remands,
reversals and reduced Chevron deference to agency interpretations may also be
an effective method of forcing more positive reforms of the administrative
adjudication process.60
The decisions concerning judicial review, although not the product of a
coordinated effort at reform, reflect a judicial eagerness to interpret statutes in
light of the important public policy of adequate judicial review. The judicial
reluctance, typically expressed through the application of canons of statutory
construction, to find a preclusion of judicial review makes it more difficult than
normal for Congress to enact its legislative preferences.61 Unless Congress has
spoken with extraordinarily clear language indicating a specific desire to limit
judicial review, courts will interpret the statutory language to retain judicial
review.62
The avoidance canon has been particularly important in ensuring judicial
review of immigration decisions. Although decisions invoking the avoidance
canon ultimately rest on statutory interpretations, they employ constitutional
reasoning that often functions as precedent.63 In INS v. St. Cyr,64 for example,
the Court, through the avoidance canon and the Suspension Clause, has ensured
58. This Article addresses only the availability, at any point, of judicial review of final orders of
deportation. There are, however, many issues regarding when courts should consider challenges to the
government’s immigration decisions, as well as the availability of class action relief. See generally
Hiroshi Motomura, Judicial Review in Immigration Cases After AADC: Lessons from Civil Procedure,
14 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 385 (2000).
59. See Slocum, supra note 32, at 64 (describing how courts often apply canons of statutory
construction that reflect public values that are likely at odds with Congress’s legislative intent regarding
the statute at issue).
60. See supra Part II.B. (describing the judicial reaction to the executive branch reforms).
61. See Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Presumption of Reviewability: A Study in Canonical Construction
and Its Consequences, 45 VAND. L. REV. 743, 746-47 (1992).
62. See supra Part II.A.
63. See Daniel J. Meltzer, Congress, Courts, and Constitutional Remedies, 86 GEO. L.J. 2537, 2585
(1998) (arguing that a “court’s pronouncement that a particular reading of a statute would raise serious
constitutional questions is likely to have the same effect as a pronouncement that the statute, read that
way, is in fact unconstitutional”).
64. 533 U.S. 289 (2001).

2007]

COURTS VS. THE POLITICAL BRANCHES

521

a significant level of judicial review via habeas corpus or an “adequate substitute through the courts of appeals.”65 Following the Court’s decision in St. Cyr
preserving habeas corpus jurisdiction, Congress enacted the REAL ID Act of
2005, which generally eliminated from courts habeas corpus jurisdiction to
review final orders of removal.66 Significantly, however, Congress removed
many of the bars to judicial review in the federal courts of appeals that caused
criminal aliens to file habeas corpus petitions in district courts in order to
challenge their removal orders.67 As a result of St. Cyr, courts have jurisdiction
to review constitutional challenges and other questions of law, including those
related to criminal aliens and to discretionary relief from deportation.68
The judicial decisions preserving judicial review and habeas corpus have
been based on statutory rather than constitutional interpretations and are thus
subject to reversal by Congress. They can thus be viewed as a relatively
restrained method of blocking congressional reforms. A remarkable aspect of
the Supreme Court’s statutory interpretation decisions involving the avoidance
canon, however, is that such decisions can give aliens as a whole greater rights,
at least temporarily, than would decisions that rested on constitutional grounds.
In a recent immigration decision, Clark v. Martinez,69 the Court held that a
statutory interpretation made by invoking the avoidance canon must be uniformly applied in subsequent cases even when the later cases do not raise any
constitutional issues.70 Using similar reasoning to that of Martinez, some lower
courts held that the Court’s statutory decision in St. Cyr compelled a finding that
non-criminal aliens could challenge their removal orders through habeas corpus
in district courts even though they, unlike criminal aliens, were able to obtain
judicial review through the review provisions set forth in the INA.71 Considering that habeas corpus jurisdiction could have been constitutionally repealed
with respect to the non-criminal aliens who had an adequate forum for judicial
review in the court of appeals, the statutory decision in St. Cyr was actually
more favorable to the non-criminal aliens than a constitutional decision would

65. See id. at 314 n.38; see also supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text (describing how the Court
has required Congress to be incredibly precise if it intends to preclude habeas review).
66. See Ishak v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 22, 28 (1st Cir. 2005) (describing how the “Real ID Act
amended section 242 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1252, to place review of all final removal orders, for both
criminal and non-criminal aliens, in the courts of appeals”).
67. See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law and Federal Court Jurisdiction through the Lens of
Habeas Corpus, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 459, 487 (2006).
68. See id. at 463.
69. 543 U.S. 371 (2005).
70. The Court extended the Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), statutory holding, which was
that aliens who have entered the country cannot be detained indefinitely, to include inadmissible aliens
(aliens who have not entered the country) without determining whether indefinite detention of inadmissible aliens would raise a serious constitutional question. The Court reasoned that “[it] is not at all
unusual to give a statute’s ambiguous language a limiting construction called for by one of the statute’s
applications, even though other of the statute’s applications, standing alone, would not support the same
limitation.” See Martinez, 543 U.S. at 380.
71. See Slocum, supra note 32, at 44-46.
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have been.72
2. The Limits of a Judicial Approach that Focuses on Non-constitutional
Decisions
The judiciary’s efforts in undermining the reforms of the political branches
have been more successful than many commentators have recognized. Nevertheless, the judiciary’s efforts have been limited by its relatively conservative
jurisprudential approach to the reforms. The administrative adjudication process
designed by the executive branch remains in place because the judiciary has not
invalidated any aspect of it on constitutional grounds.73 Similarly, the judiciary’s approach to the reforms of judicial review has been subject to the inherent
limitations of undermining reform through non-constitutional decisions. A narrow statutory interpretation, even one produced by applying a canon of statutory
interpretation, is only permissible if the narrow interpretation is at least plausible.74
Because the judiciary has limited itself to statutory, rather than constitutional
holdings, there is no right to judicial review in many important immigration
cases. Often, for example, the contested issue will not be whether the alien is
removable (on the basis of a criminal conviction, for example) but whether the
alien should be granted a waiver or relief from removal, which almost always
requires a favorable exercise of discretion by the Attorney General.75 In order to
receive the relief termed “cancellation of removal,” for example, the alien must
establish both that she is eligible for the relief and that she merits a favorable
exercise of discretion.76 Under the REAL ID Act, a question of whether the
Attorney General correctly interpreted a statutory requirement for relief is
reviewable by courts as a legal question.77 As courts have correctly recognized,
however, the current judicial review provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B),
provides that the ultimate discretionary decision whether to grant relief from

72. See id.
73. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
74. The trigger for any substantive canon is something less than statutory clarity, but not all canons
are triggered by the same level of uncertainty. Clear statement canons, for example, are triggered by
less statutory ambiguity than are tie-breaker canons. See Slocum, supra note 11, at 544-46. In any case,
even the strongest canons are not applied when the statutory language clearly reflects congressional
intent.
75. See Lenni Benson, The New World of Judicial Review of Removal Orders, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
233, 240 (1998) (“Although no formal statistics are available, my own calculations establish that the
vast majority of immigration cases involved review of a discretionary form of relief.”)
76. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (2000) (providing that the “Attorney General may cancel removal” if the alien
is statutorily eligible for relief) (emphasis added). The statutory provision gives the Attorney General
unconstrained discretion to grant relief from removal. Congress has provided no criteria that the
Attorney General must consider or factors for the Attorney General to weigh in deciding whether to
grant relief.
77. 8 U.S.C.S. § 1252(a)(2)(D) (LexisNexis 2006) (providing that the preclusion of judicial review
of discretionary determinations involving relief from deportation in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) does not
preclude review of “questions of law”).
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deportation is not reviewable.78 Considering the lack of independence in the
administrative adjudication process, the vesting of complete and unreviewable
discretion in the Attorney General regarding whether an alien should be allowed
to reside in this country has understandably troubled immigration scholars.79
III. THE FUTURE OF IMMIGRATION REFORM
Despite the obvious deficiences that still afflict judicial and administrative
review, relatively bold constitutional decisions are needed from the Supreme
Court in order to fix the remaining problems. Section A of this Part discusses the
likelihood of such decisions and the possibility that Congress itself will enact
beneficial reforms to judicial and administrative review. Unfortunately, although
they are needed, reforms of judicial and administrative review would not
resolve the more problematic ways in which immigration law fails to conform
to the rule of law. Section B takes a broader look at the state of immigration law
and argues that the political branches, rather than the judiciary, will have to fix
these rule of law deficiencies.
A. The Possibility that the Judiciary or Congress will Reform Judicial Review
and the Administrative Adjudication Process
If the Court desired to reform the administrative adjudication system, it could
focus on the administrative process and hold, for example, that some, or all, of
the executive branch’s reforms are a denial of due process.80 At the same time,
the Court could hold that the constitutionally required habeas corpus review
includes claims that the Attorney General failed to exercise, or abused, his
discretion.81 The abuse of discretion standard would allow courts to overturn
decisions not to grant relief from removal where the Attorney General failed to
78. See, e.g., Ekasinta v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 1188 (10th Cir. 2005) (dismissing for lack of
jurisdiction in a case where the alien’s application for cancellation of removal was denied on
discretionary grounds). Other important jurisdictional issues are still unresolved. For example, courts
must decide whether mixed questions of law and fact are reviewable. See Note, Aaron G. Leiderman,
Preserving the Constitution’s Most Important Human Right: Judicial Review of Mixed Questions the
Real ID Act, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1367 (2006).
79. See, e.g., Legomsky, supra note 7.
80. Thus far, courts have been unwilling to make such rulings. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text. The Court could hold that the independence of the BIA and Immigration Judges from the
Attorney General is required as a matter of Due Process, but such a decision would be quite bold. The
closest the Court has come to such a decision was in United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347
U.S. 260 (1954), when the Court held that once the Attorney General had by regulation delegated his
authority over deportation cases to the BIA, he was prohibited from exercising that authority himself by
dictating the outcome of a particular case. It would be a dramatic extension of the case for the Court to
hold that the Attorney General is constitutionally prohibited from exercising control over the hiring or
firing of Immigration Judges and members of the BIA.
81. See Cole, supra note 19, at 2505 (arguing that the “denial of discretionary relief . . . can be
reviewed on habeas corpus because it necessarily leads to the individual’s detention, and therefore must
be subject to judicial review to determine whether the detention is in accordance with law”). But see
Meltzer, supra note 63, at 2584 (stating that “the argument that the Constitution requires such review in
each and every case is . . . problematic”). Another option would be for the Court to hold that habeas
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exercise discretion that was given or failed to give a reasoned explanation for a
decision.82
Both a decision striking down aspects of the administrative adjudication
process on due process grounds and a decision requiring habeas corpus review
of discretionary determinations would be consistent with the plenary power
doctrine. The government does not receive the benefit of the doctrine in cases
involving due process or a claim that a statute violates a structural provision of
the Constitution rather than an amendment to the Constitution.83 In addition,
such decisions would be relatively modest because they would allow Congress
to decide substantive immigration issues, and would thus not interfere with the
foreign affairs concerns underlying the plenary power doctrine.84
Of course, the judiciary would not need to make bold constitutional decisions
if the political branches enacted reforms that were designed to improve the
immigration system.85 As other immigration commentators have argued, Congress should reform judicial review and provide for judicial review of all
aspects of a final order of deportation.86 Unfortunately, if recent history is any
indication, Congress’s efforts at reform of judicial review are not likely to
involve attempts to improve the judicial review process for aliens. Indeed,
recent legislative proposals have included provisions that would consolidate
immigration appeals in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or
would provide for a screening process under which a single federal appellate
judge could deny a petition for review.87
Like the case with judicial review, Congress or the executive branch should
reform the administrative adjudication process to provide for adequate adminis-

corpus is required under the Suspension Clause in all cases where judicial review is statutorily
precluded. See Legomsky, supra note 7, at 407.
82. See Meltzer, supra note 63, at 2584.
83. See Slocum, supra note 32, at 33 (explaining how the Court has limited the reach of the plenary
power doctrine in cases involving due process challenges or allegations that a structural provision of the
Constitution has been violated). Such decisions would also reflect the Court’s bias for procedural over
substantive values. See William N. Eskridge, Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L.
REV. 1007, 1085-86 (1989).
84. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Federal Regulation of Aliens and the Constitution, 83 AM. J. INT’L
L. 862, 863 (1989) (stating that the Court has “approached the question of congressional power from
the perspective of the conduct of foreign affairs”).
85. To date, the only recent immigration reform that Congress has enacted is the Secure Fence Act of
2006, Pub. L. No. 109-367, 120 Stat. 2638 (2006) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1103), which addresses the
security of the border between Mexico and the United States.
86. See Medina, supra note 19, at 1562.
87. See Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005, H.R. 4437,
109th Cong. § 805 (unenacted) (as passed by House, Dec. 16, 2005) (providing for certificate of
reviewability by single federal circuit judge); Securing America’s Borders Act, S. 2454, 109th Cong.
§ 501 (providing for review in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit); see also ANDORRA
BRUNO, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (CRS), REPORT FOR CONGRESS: ENFORCING IMMIGRATION LAW:
IMMIGRATION LEGISLATION AND ISSUES IN THE 109TH CONGRESS, at 18 (2006) (stating that “[i]t seems likely
that, even if these consolidation and other proposals are not ultimately included in any immigration
legislation enacted this Congress, they would be reintroduced in the future”).
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trative review for all aliens.88 In contrast perhaps with judicial review, the
political branches do have incentives to reform the administrative adjudication
process in a manner that makes the system fairer for aliens.89 The recent
reforms made by the executive branch have led to widespread dissatisfaction
with the administrative adjudication process among aliens and their attorneys.
This dissatisfaction has resulted in a dramatic increase in not only the number of
cases that are appealed to federal circuit courts but also in an increase in the
percentage of appeals from BIA decisions, which has placed a greater burden on
federal courts.90 At least some reforms are thus not inconceivable. Indeed, one
congressional proposal, for example, would attempt to ensure the independence
of the BIA and Immigration Judges from the Attorney General.91
Some of Congress’s attempts at immigration reform, even those that are
well-intentioned, may make the administrative adjudication process worse,
instead of better, however. For example, with millions of undocumented immigrants in this country, and a need for their services, some type of legalization
program is likely, if not inevitable.92 As recent history illustrates, such a
program may well be desirable for both aliens and the country as a whole, but it
would likely exacerbate the already existing backlog of cases in the administrative system.93 In 1986, Congress passed the Immigration Reform and Control
Act94 and while millions of undocumented immigrants were legalized, the INS
did not have the capacity to properly investigate the applications that were
filed.95 Any legalization program enacted by Congress would likely create
similar problems.96

88. See, e.g., Legomsky, supra note 7. Criticism of the administrative adjudication process is not
new. See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck & Theodore H. Wang, Continuity and Change: Patterns of Immigration
Litigation in the Courts, 1979-1990, 45 STAN. L. REV. 115, 177 (1992) (indicating that successful
impact lawsuits, “coupled with Congress’s failure to overturn their results, provide a clear signal that
some important aspects of the INS’ administrative performance are deeply and systematically flawed”).
89. Indeed, the Attorney General has indicated a willingness to study the administrative adjudication
system, although his commitment to truly reforming the system in a positive manner is questionable.
See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
90. See Palmer et al., supra note 21, at 94.
91. See Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006, S. 2611, 109th Cong. § 229 (as passed by
Senate, May 25, 2006).
92. See Cassie Coppage, Developments in the Legislative Branch, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 545 (2006)
(describing current proposals for legalizing undocumented aliens).
93. See RUTH E. WASEM, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (CRS), REPORT FOR CONGRESS: TOWARD
MORE EFFECTIVE IMMIGRATION POLICIES: SELECTED ORGANIZATIONAL ISSUES 1 (2006) (stating that there are
concerns whether the Department of Homeland Security can handle the increased immigration workload that would come from a legalization program).
94. Pub. L. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986).
95. See Darlene C. Goring, In Service to America: Naturalization of Undocumented Alien Veterans,
31 SETON HALL L. REV. 400, 463 & n.259 (2000).
96. Thus, even Congress’ well-intentioned immigration reforms could lead to greater burdens on the
administrative adjudication system, and, consequently, greater judicial frustration with the system.
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B. The Rule of Law and the Necessity of Broad Reform of Immigration Law
Reforming judicial and administrative review would be a positive development in immigration law. The availability of adequate administrative and judicial review is an important component of the rule of law.97 Nevertheless, the
benefits of such limited reform should not be overstated. The most pressing
injustices in immigration law stem from the extremely harsh substantive laws
passed by Congress, and the reforms of judicial and administrative review
described above would not necessarily resolve the many other ways in which
immigration law fails to conform to rule of law requirements.
There is disagreement amongst scholars about the definition and requirements
of the rule of law. Most definitions look to the presence of specific criteria in the
law or the legal system.98 Although there is no definitive list of formal criteria,
and different definitions may use different standards, typical rule of law definitions require many things which immigration law lacks, such as laws that are
obeyed, equally enforced, independently adjudicated, clear and determinate, and
prospectively applied.
One of the most controversial aspects of the rule of law definition is whether
it requires a substantive test of moral correctness or at least acceptability.99 To
the extent that the rule of law requires substantive acceptability, immigration
law would fail the requirement in many respects, however it is defined. The
harshness and unfairness of immigration laws is legendary. For example, aliens
can be separated from their families and deported, without any weighing of the
equities of their cases, for having committed minor crimes (including misdemeanors) many years after their entry into the United States.100 In addition, the
available grounds for relief from deportation are so narrow that some have
argued that they likely violate international law.101

97. See Robert S. Summers, The Principles of the Rule of Law, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1691, 1694
(1999); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97 COLUM.
L. REV. 1, 9, 18 (1997).
98. See David Tolbert & Andrew Solomon, United Nations Reform and Supporting the Rule of Law
in Post-Conflict Societies, 19 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 29, 31 (2006); Jeffrey Kahn, The Search for the Rule
of Law in Russia, 37 GEO. J. INT’L L. 353, 359 (2006) (noting the “often unhelpfully conclusory and
imprecise” definitions of the rule of law).
99. See Fallon, supra note 97, at 1, 21-22; Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Tension Between Legal
Instrumentalism and the Rule of Law, 33 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 131, 131-32 (2005) (describing
the “substantive version of the rule of law” which “ensures the ‘rightness’ of law in accordance with a
preexisting higher standard”).
100. See Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and the Limited
Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1936 (2000).
101. See, e.g., Beharry v. Reno, 183 F. Supp. 2d 584, 595-96 (E.D.N.Y. 2002), rev’d on jurisdictional grounds sub nom., Beharry v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that the current relief
grounds violate international norms against arbitrary interference with one’s family and a right to be
allowed to submit the reasons against his expulsion); Bobbie Marie Guerra, Comment, A Tortured
Construction: The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act’s Express Bar Denying Criminal Aliens Withholding of Deportation Defies the Principles of International Law, 28 ST.
MARY’S L.J. 941, 975-84 (1997) (identifying inconsistencies between United States law and international agreements).
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Even if one disagrees with the notion that the rule of law requires substantive
moral acceptability, many other areas of immigration law fail to comply with
the basic, and less controversial, requirements of the rule of law. The rule of law
requires that the law be clear and determinate in meaning, which is understandably more difficult in the administrative state because Congress often enacts
broad, and vague, legislative schemes for agencies to administer.102 Nevertheless, immigration law is notorious for the amount and scope of discretion
afforded the executive branch. Congress typically enacts immigration statutes
which leave the executive branch with an enormous amount of discretion to
define statutory terms and apply the laws in whatever ways the executive branch
sees fit.103 The broad discretion granted the executive branch can be difficult to
overcome for aliens, even with judicial review.104
Making matters worse, the extreme discretion granted the executive branch in
immigration matters allows the executive branch to easily violate the rule of law
requirement that laws be applied in a nondiscriminatory manner.105 The broad
power that the executive branch possesses to apply immigration laws in a
discriminatory manner is illustrated in its use of immigration laws in the War on
Terrorism. The executive branch has used immigration laws in objectionable
and discriminatory, but apparently unreviewable, ways in allegedly protecting
national security, such as targeting Muslims and Arabs for surveillance, detention and deportation.106
Immigration law fails to comply with the rule of law in a myriad of ways, in
addition to those already described. A few more examples should suffice to
prove the point. The rule of law requires that changes in the law have prospec-

102. See Fallon, supra note 97, at 48-49 (describing the rule of law requirement of determinate
laws); Summers, supra note 97, at 1693 (same).
103. See Kanstroom, supra note 8 (explaining the broad-ranging discretion granted the executive
branch in immigration matters).
104. See, e.g., INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 428, 431 (1999) (holding that a statute making
an alien ineligible for withholding of deportation if the alien had committed a serious nonpolitical crime
did not require the balancing of the alien’s criminal acts against the risk of persecution if returned to his
home country or require a consideration of the atrociousness of the alien’s acts); INS v. Yang, 519 U.S.
26, 31-32 (1997) (holding that Attorney General could consider acts of fraud committed by alien in
deciding whether to grant discretionary waiver of deportation because the statute did not impose any
limitations on the factors that the Attorney General could consider in determining who should be
granted relief); INS v. Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 145 (1981) (holding, in a case involving an application for
suspension of deportation, that the Attorney General had the authority to construe the “extreme
hardship” requirement narrowly if he so desired). Even if statutory eligibility has been established, and
the Attorney General’s discretionary determination of whether relief should be granted is reviewable,
the Supreme Court has in the past emphasized that judicial review should be extremely narrow. See
Yang, 519 U.S. at 30 (indicating that the authority of the executive to suspend deportation is an “act of
grace,” exercised according to the Attorney General’s “unfettered discretion”).
105. See Fallon, supra note 97, at 9 (discussing the requirement of “instrumentalities of impartial
justice”).
106. See Susan M. Akram & Maritza Karmely, Immigration and Constitutional Consequences of
Post-9/11 Policies Involving Arabs and Muslims in the United State: Is Alienage a Distinction Without
a Difference?, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 609, 621 (2005) (describing the massive arrests that occurred
after the attacks of 9/11).
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tive rather than retroactive effect.107 Congress frequently passes immigration
laws with retroactive effect, however, and the Court has consistently held that
such statutes are constitutional because deportation is not punishment.108 The
rule of law requires that people be ruled by the law and obey it, but as many as
twelve million workers are without legal authority to be in the United States,
making immigration law appear as though it is unenforceable.109 Immigration
law is also notoriously confusing and complex, which makes the immigration
system difficult for aliens to navigate, especially considering that they have no
constitutional or statutory rights to government provided legal representation.110
Without reform of the rule of law deficiencies described above, immigration
law will remain unfair and unjust, regardless of whether there are adequate
judicial review and administrative adjudication procedures. It is true that,
similar to judicial interpretations of judicial review provisions, the harshness of
substantive immigration laws is sometimes mitigated by aggressive statutory
interpretations by the judiciary.111 While laudable, such statutory decisions, like
the decisions interpreting judicial review provisions, are subject to the inherent
limits of interpretation.112 Unfortunately, the judiciary has not shown any
indication that it is likely to radically undermine the plenary power doctrine,
and help bring the rule of law to immigration law, through aggressive constitutional decisions.113 The sobering reality is that the only hope for true reform of
immigration law is through congressional reforms that aim to improve immigration law, rather than respond to political expediency.
CONCLUSION
As this Article has illustrated, contrary to the common perception of a passive

107. See Ahmed A. White, Capitalism, Social Marginality, and the Rule of Law’s Uncertain Fate in
Modern Society, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 759, 765 (2005).
108. See Slocum, supra note 11, at 527-28. For an example of a recent case, see Fernandez-Vargas v.
Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. 2422, 2429-30 (2006) (holding that Congress was sufficiently clear in expressing
its intent that a provision of IIRIRA governing the reinstatement of prior removal orders be applied to
conduct that occurred before the effective date of IIRIRA).
109. See Fallon, supra note 97, at 8. I am not advocating the deportation of undocumented
immigrants but merely pointing out yet another way in which our immigration system does not conform
to rule of law ideals.
110. See, e.g., Drax v. Reno 338 F. 3d 98, 99-100 (2d Cir. 2003) (“This case vividly illustrates the
labyrinthine character of modern immigration law-a maze of hyper-technical statutes and regulations
that engender waste, delay and confusion for the Government and petitioners alike.”); AlanisBustamante v. Reno 201 F.3d 1303, 1308 (11th Cir. 2000) (“It would seem that should be a simple issue
with a clear answer, but this is immigration law where the issues are seldom simple and the answers are
far from clear.”).
111. See generally Slocum, supra note 32.
112. See supra Part II.C.2. (discussing the inherent limitations of non-constitutional decisions).
113. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (describing the long-standing plenary power doctrine
and how the doctrine shields political branch decisions from judicial invalidation on constitutional
grounds); see also Slocum, supra note 32, at 50 n.222 (arguing that even if the plenary power doctrine
were ended, as many immigration scholars desire, it is not clear how many more constitutional
challenges to immigration statutes would be successful).
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and deferential judiciary in immigration cases, courts have made significant
efforts to undermine the reforms of the political branches. Nevertheless, the
relatively conservative nature of the judiciary’s jurisprudential approach has left
various pernicious elements of the judicial review and administrative adjudication process reforms intact. It is no doubt true that adequate judicial review and
a properly functioning administrative adjudication process are indispensable to
the successful operation of the administrative state. Further reforms of judicial
review and the administrative adjudication process, while welcomed, would not
address the most pressing problems of immigration law, however. Until its harsh
and unfair substantive laws are changed, and immigration law is otherwise
brought into conformity with the rule of law, immigration law will continue to
remain isolated from other areas of public law.

